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Abstract
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard is a set of twelve security
requirements applicable to all institutions and systems handling, storing or
transmitting cardholder information. It was created by the main card brands in a
united effort to respond to the increasing number of attacks and data breaches cases
targeted and linked to card and cardholder data. The standard considers points such
as policies design, data security, network architecture, software design, application
security, transmission encryption requirements and so on. Being compliant with the
standard can be both expensive and traumatic for any business willing to do it. This
research analyzes the impact that this compliance achievement process can have on an
enterprise. This work is focused on the networking infrastructure and security and
application security in general. This is a case study based on a real situation, where
real current procedures and implementations were evaluated against the standard
requirements regarding networking design, security and applications security. This
will provide a benchmark of the situation towards getting the compliance validation in
the company subject of this case study.
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1. Introduction
Credit cards have become a very common way to handle money transactions around
the globe. The amount of credit cards being issued keeps going up each year. We have
gone a long way since the emission of the first credit card in 1958 (Woolsey & Schulz,
2010). In the USA by June 30, 2009 Visa had 309 million credit cards circulating;
Master Card 211 million by September 30, 2009; American Express 54 million by
December 31, 2008 and Discover 57.1 million by the same year (Woolsey & Schulz,
2010). From those numbers it can be inferred a total estimate of 631.1 million credit
cards were spread all over the country by the end of 2009. Extending those numbers to
the globe, and considering debit cards, probably we would be talking about billions of
cards doing billions of transactions each day.
Card numbers have always been a temptation for delinquents; cardholder’s data
(name, account number, pin) is very useful information for identity theft purposes and
a cloned credit card can give a vandal immediate money to spend without being notice
for a while.
Credit card information and cardholder’s data can be illegally collected from several
sources such as: garbage, mailboxes, personal records on a hospital or at your
workplace, electronically stolen from e-commerce sites, through phishing or with the
use of hacking techniques targeted to databases of any company that is known to
handle credit card information (Obringer, 2002).
Early in the past decade electronic frauds and hacking techniques started giving
serious headaches and represent big losses to companies of all sizes. In 2007 TJX
Companies Inc. reported a data breach compromising more than 45 million credit and
debit card data; at that moment it was considered the biggest data breach ever
(Bosworth, 2007). Before that, in 2005, CardSystems Solutions a payment processor
had an intrusion that was presumed having compromised about 40 million credit card
4
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numbers (Krazit, 2005). More recently in 2009, Network Solutions had an incident
were about 573,000 debit and credit cards accounts were compromised (Krebs, 2009)
while HeartLand Payments Systems had a data breach case, also in 2009, even though
they alleged no card data was compromised. It is possible to continue citing cases like
these for another couple of paragraphs, but it is enough to illustrate the idea, that
those incidents were part of the driving factors (along with disclosure laws and some
other particular situations) on the development of enhanced security requirements
and standards.
Some years ago before PCI DSS different card brands had made their individual efforts
on security initiatives; Visa developed the Cardholder Information Security Program
(CISP) and the Account Information Security (AIS) while MasterCard created the Site
Data Protection Program (SDP)(Gorge, 2006); American Express had the (DSS) Data
Security Standards and Discover Card –(DISC) the Discover Card Information
Security and Compliance (Security Assessment, 2007).
Paradoxically, data breaches incidents like those mentioned above made the Payment
Card Industry major representatives think that

the security topic needed to be

addressed as a joint effort in order to make it work. The idea was involving all
stakeholders in the protection of their most important assets: cards and cardholder
data. That is how the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) was
born. The main card brands (American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB
International, MasterCard Worldwide and Visa Inc. International) formed the PCI
Security Standards Council that later would release the PCI DSS standard on its first
version.
The standard attempts to be a guide on how to approach data security for companies
handling credit card transactions in order to minimize the risks of data breaches,
identity theft and frauds related to cardholders’ data. However getting stakeholders
complying with the standard has not been an easy road, and actually represents a
transforming process for every company affected by it, worth of a case study.
5
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The following document contains documentation on a case of study about the PCI DSS
compliance process for a Dominican financial institution and the impact it has had on
its network designing and technological infrastructure security.

6
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2. Antecedents
2.1.

What is it about?

PCI DSS is a Security Standard. Its objective is to protect cardholder data. Its
requirements should be applied on any system, server and/or network containing this
type of data. Cardholder data includes: PAN: Principal Account Number or Card
Number, Cardholder Name, Card Expiration Date, Service Code, Sensitive
Authentication Data: Full magnetic stripe data, CAV2/CVC2/CVV2/CID1 and
PINs/PIN blocks. “The Primary Account Number (PAN) is the defining factor in the
applicability of PCI DSS requirements and PA-DSS2. If PAN is not stored, processed,
or transmitted, PCI DSS and PA-DSS do not apply (PCI Security Standards Council
LLC, 2008)”
The vast majority of financial institutions (or any institution affected by the standard)
do not possess a whole infrastructure or resources exclusively dedicated to handle card
transactions and cardholders’ data thus in most cases, not to say in all of them, PCI
DSS requirements will affect the entire technological infrastructure and organization;
that is the reason why this standard supposes such a big impact on the institutions
willing to comply with it.
PCI DSS establishes the following twelve requirements:
Build and Maintain a Secure Network
Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder
data.

1
2

See Glossary

Payment Application Data Security Standard
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Requirement 2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other
security parameters.
Protect Cardholder Data
Requirement 3: Protect stored cardholder data.
Requirement 4: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks
Maintain a Vulnerability Management Program
Requirement 5: Use and regularly update anti-virus software or programs
Requirement 6: Develop and maintain secure systems and applications
Implement Strong Access Control Measures
Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-to-know
Requirement 8: Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access
Requirement 9: Restrict physical access to cardholder data
Regularly Monitor and Test Networks
Requirement 10: Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder
data
Requirement 11: Regularly test security systems and processes
Maintain an Information Security Policy
Requirement 12: Maintain a policy that addresses information security for employees
and contractors.
But, how such common sense directives can be so difficult to achieve? Some of the
problems come with the sizes of the companies and the comprehension of the standard
as well. Sometimes, misconception of the requirements leads to major difficulties on
implementations.

8
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2.2.

Who is the target?

PCI DSS applies to any merchants, service providers, and financial institutions that
handle, store, process or transmit cardholder data (Bradley, et al., 2007). Merchants
are defined as any company that receives a card payment in exchange of a good or
service. Service Providers are companies that process, store or transmit cardholder
data; they might serve merchants or other service providers (Bradley, et al., 2007).
The standard classifies members, merchants, and service providers into different
levels according to the number of transactions they handle. The classification also
defines diverse compliance validation procedures and who is responsible for validating
the compliance.
Table 1 – Compliance validation summary Table for merchants (www.ncsu.edu,
2005)(Bitter, 2009) (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2009)
Merchant
Level
1

Description

Compliance Validation

Validated By

More than 6,000,000 annual
credit card transactions;
Global Merchants identified as
level 1 by any Visa region;
or
Any merchant that has
suffered an attack causing
account
data
to
be
compromised

Annual On-site data security
audit;
Quarterly Network Scan
Annual external/internal
Penetration tests

Qualified

Independent

security assessor; or
Internal audit
Approved Scanning vendor
(ASV)

Any business classified as
level one by any other credit
card company.
2

3

4

1,000,000
to
6,000,000
annual transactions

20K to 1,000,000 transactions
per year

Less than 20K annual
transaction (Visa Credit Card
e-commerce transactions)
Less
than
1,000,000
traditional Visa credit card
transactions.

Annual self-assessment;
Quarterly Network Scan
Annual external/internal
Penetration tests
Annual self-assessment;
Quarterly Network Scan
Annual external/internal
Penetration tests
Annual
self-assessment
(recommended);
Quarterly Network Scan
(recommended)

Merchant;
Approved Scanning Vendor
(ASV)
Merchant;
Approved Scanning

Vendor

(ASV)

Merchant;
Approved Scanning Vendor
(ASV)
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Service Provider Level

Description

Compliance Validation

1

More than 300,000 annual
transactions
Less than 300,000 annual
transactions

Annual On-site data security audit;
Quarterly Network Scan
Annual self-assessment Questionnaire
(SAQ);
Quarterly Network Scan

2

2.3.

Some History

PCI DSS was settled as mandatory back in 2004. The latest compliance dates were
established for 2007. (Miller). In 2005 several USA major (and minor) retailers and
card processors were victims of data breaches incidents that exposed millions of credit
card numbers and cardholders confidential information.
According to data contained in the Chronology of Data Breaches (Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, 2010), provided by the privacy rights Clearinghouse from the United
States with data compiled from incidents within that country, a total of 345,124,400
records containing sensitive personal information were affected by security breaches
in the USA since January 2005 to February 2010. Those breaches occurred on several
different entities: universities, hospitals, Stores, banks and other financial institutions.
According to the ITRC (Identity Theft Resource Center, 2008), who keeps statistics on
data breaches cases, in 2005 there was a “total of 158 disclosed incidents, potentially
affecting more than 64.8 million individuals plus 20 undisclosed victim group
populations” (ITRC, 2006); While in 2006 (ITRC, 2007) “At least 312 incidents have
been disclosed, potentially affecting more than 19 million individuals:

30% of

disclosures involve governmental or military agencies; 28%, educational institutions;
21%, general business; 13%, health care facilities or companies; and 8%, banking,
credit or financial services entities”.
In 2007 (ITRC, 2008) there were 446 incidents and 127,725,343 records were exposed
(although a record does not necessarily mean an individual because multiple records
might be bound to only one individual, this is still a high number). The incidents were
10 
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distributed

under

the

following

categories:

Medical/Healthcare

14.6%,

Government/Military 24.7%, Educational 24.9%, General Business 28.9%, 7.0%
Banking/Credit/Financial.
In 2009 (ITRC, 2010) a total of 498 breaches incidents were reported with
222,477,043 records exposed. The breaches corresponded to: Medical/Healthcare
13.7%, Government/Military 18.1%, Educational 15.7%, General Business 41.2%,
Banking/Credit/Financial 11.4%.

For 2010 so far there have been reported 35

breaches affecting 1,422,304 records.
According to Tech//404 Data Loss Calculator (Allied World Assurance Company,
2006) a security incident where 1000 records are compromised can cost a company an
average of US$ 199, 526.00. Imagine cases as the ones contained in the reports
mentioned above with numbers of records compromised as large as 2,900,000 records
have been compromised (ITRC, 2007).
Credit card brands are aware of the fact that compromised data can cost a lot of
money; this is especially true for card/cardholders data. They are also conscious that
data breaches can turn into identity theft cases affecting the reputation of their
industry. This is especially harmful since the industry could lose plenty of its gains if
people start thinking that credit cards are not a safe way to handle their finances.
In order to minimize the risk of having card/cardholder data compromised, losing a
lot of money and damaging a reputation, it is necessary to implement comprehensive
security measures on the systems and environment where this data resides. It is also
necessary to make everybody in the card payment business knowing of the need for
collaboration and engagement with security on the infrastructure handling
card/cardholder information. That is how PCI DSS came into the scenario.

11 
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2.4.

PCI DSS Compliance Validation

In order to complete PCI DSS requirements companies can hire a Qualified Security
Assessor (QSA) who is authorized to provide both assessment and guidance to
institutions willing to comply with the standard. VISA certifies that QSAs are well
trained and can assist a business on their road toward compliance. However hiring a
QSA is not as easy as just thinking you need one and calling asking for their services.
Having a QSA can cost you a lot of money depending on the size of the company and
the range of services you are requiring from this QSA. Those services can include
several things such as: an initial assessment to evaluate in which stage the institution
is positioned on the road to compliance, or how much will be needed to change,
evaluate or invest in order to achieve the compliance. Also, this QSA might be the
person responsible of completing your Report On Compliance (ROC).
The Report On Compliance is sort of an assessment form that is completed either for
evaluation purposes or to be sent to the proper authorities stating that your business is
considered to be in compliance with the standard and can be evaluated at any
moment.

There is another type of assessment filled out to validate compliance the

Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAC).
The difference between Report On Compliance and a Self-Assessment Questionnaire is
that while the Report On Compliance is a document filled by institutions that must be
validated by the brands, the Self-Assessment Questionnaire (valid to certify
compliance of level 3 merchants) is an evaluation that does not need to be validated by
any third party.
Why would it be necessary to hire a QSA in order to receive guidance to be compliant
with this standard? Getting PCI DSS compliance is more than just a project. It is a
whole transformation process, and as any process there could be resistance to start
12 
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working on it. This resistance might be due to several reasons such as: an insufficiency
of resources, including money, time and personnel to complete the tasks that are
supposed to be executed in order to be compliant with the standard. That is why some
help from an outsider is not only welcomed but also required, even if it costs you a lot.
Another factor considered is that setting down PCI DSS compliance in any company is
not only about reading the documents provided by VISA, and filling a checklist. It is
more about adapting the statements settled by the standard to the reality of the
enterprise in a manner that allows evaluating accurately the technological
infrastructure status and changes required to achieve compliance.
The decision from a company of having a QSA or a QSAC to help them during the
procedure or to do it by themselves will strongly depend on the amount of resources
the company can destine to achieve PCI DSS compliance. If a company understands
that it has capable personnel that can complete the requirements and is willing to
assign PCI DSS as an internal project to that personnel under complete assurance that
they can lead the project and execute all the required activities, it is fine designate that
personnel with the task of getting each PCI DSS requirement revised and done
omitting the assistance of a QSA (or QSAC). This is not the most common approach,
but it might be successful as well and even cheaper. Almost every company seeks for
assistance, because they find themselves overwhelmed with all the things that come up
from a process of this magnitude.

2.5.

Network Design and PCI DSS Impact

As we know a company does not necessarily emerge with an understandable idea on
how their technological infrastructure will be implemented, at least in this country
(Dominican Republic). Even when they do have clear network design in mind, they
eventually grow and have major or minor changes that affect their initial designing.

13 
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An organization might completes all the steps since the initial phase in order to create
their technological platform or they can just accommodate to the situation and recycle
or reuse existing elements if it comes that they are getting part or their total
installations from somebody else.
The financial Institution selected for this case study is a relatively young one. It is an
organization which network and infrastructure deployment was not previously
designed and conceived from scratch. They inherited their physical installations and
part of its technological infrastructure from other financial institutions that used to
run their operations in the same physical place where this latest institution currently
works. This means that the networking designing process has not been actually a
“designing process”. It has been more an adaptation process. Their implementations
were created responding to necessities and evolved precisely because of those
necessities.
As any adaptation/evolution process it is understandable that several things are not
actually on the place they should be. However, it is the responsibility of the team
handling equipments, applications and installations to either improve the things they
have inherited or just completely change them and turn it into what they need them to
be. This is pretty much the process that this company is currently going through. And
not only to introduce enhancements on the infrastructure they got from the past, but
also to introduce a well planned security schema suitable to achieve PCI DSS
compliance status.

14 
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3. Motivation and Scope
The objective of this case study is to evaluate how the adoption of a security Standard
can impact the network design and the security infrastructure. The entire Dominican
Market is facing the experience of getting PCI DSS Compliance. This standard was
created back in 2004, by that time there was not a real attention or interest to respond
to the standard requirements from the affected business in Dominican Republic
(neither in USA or Europe). Also, since the standard was new, brands were not in the
position of pushing that hard to make organizations compliant. Last years the story
has changed. More and more card industry stakeholders including banks, merchants,
service providers and issuers are working to get the compliance.
September 30th 2010 is the latest date globally (except for Europe) to achieve
compliance for any enterprise handling, storing or processing card transactions. If
decide not to be compliant with the standard they can be fined and eventually lose the
right to do business with card brands. The Security Standard Council and the brands
themselves are pushing hard to get everybody to be in compliant status.
The current Case study is related to PCI DSS and this standard covers different areas
such as policies design, security approach, network architecture, software Design,
application security, transmission encryption requirements and so on. This work will
be focused only in the network designing activities and changes and the security
schema for applications. Of course, if this activities are related to cards or cardholder
environment, because PCI DSS its only applicable to those cases.

15 

Yudit María
MS NSSA Final Project

4. Methods, Materials and Procedures
The information presented on the following report was gathered by performing
interviews with people working in the technology and security areas. Names of the
participants of the interviews had been hidden for confidentiality purposes. During
those interviews questions regarding to the design of the network and the original
infrastructure diagrams from a couple of years ago were made.
There was a recompilation of existent documentation to know which things were
already implemented and established regarding documentation requirements. Tests3
on the field were also performed to validate the truthfulness of the information
provided by the interviewed personnel.
Participants
Networking Administrators Level 1
and Level 24
Security Administrators Level 1 and
Level 2
Application Developers
System Users

Materials
Policies
Network diagrams
Configuration procedures
Application development documentation
PCI DSS project complete documentation
Configuration Files

Procedure
Review Network Designs and configuration files.
Discuss information with personnel of the networking and security areas.
Execute activities to prove the affirmations of participants.
Policies revision and discussion with affected users.

3

Details on this activities has been omitted as required for confidentiality purposes

4

A higher number level means technical positions, while a lower number means a management position
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Answer for the following questions were found along the development of this research
for the company subject of the case study (it will be called Company X in the following
paragraphs):
•

Complete inventory of the changes made in the last years.

•

The driving factors leading to those changes. Which of them were actually made
because of PCI DSS.

•

Which of them contribute to PCI DSS even if they were not initially made to
comply with the standard.

•

What is the effect of those changes/new implementations to make the
infrastructure PCI DSS compliant?

•

Analysis whether the changes can be accepted as well implementations for PCI
DSS by a QSA /QSAC or by the brands.

17 
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5. Case Study Scenario
The organization featured on this case study is a national financial institution offering
multiple services for customers of different categories: single individuals, small and
medium enterprises, government, and so on.
The vast majority of its technological resources are located on a main site, there are
seventy-five branch offices making use of those centralized resources. For example,
users of remote offices access applications kept on servers located on the main site.
Sometimes local users become distance clients accessing servers and facilities remotely
using VPN connections. Also, third party vendors who are either collaborators or a
special type of client accessing services from an extranet on the main site either
through VPN tunnels or using dedicated connections. Web services are offered to allow
any customer with an Internet connection to make use of different facilities for
handling online banking activities.
Many of the services are offered within a specified office schedule while some others
are offered on 24/7 basis such as online payments and accounts consulting. Annually
they handle about six million eighty three thousand and five hundred forty seven
(6,083,547) card transactions5. This activity moves amounts of twenty millions three
hundred twelve four hundred and sixty six millions dollars (US$ 20,312,466.76)
monthly6.
Number one requirement on this institution is to have the entire infrastructure
available almost all the time. “Almost” because they have not measured their
availability necessities thus they are not able to specify it in terms of a percentage. It is
assumed that for some services the availability needs to be of 99.999 percent and for
some others a 90.00 percent is enough to cover the required time to keep their
5

According to card transactions data from 2009 and first quarter of 2010

6

This number correspond to a monthly average month from 2009 however there are peaks on the card activity both

high and low.
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services. This sentence synthesizes the business objective: to be always available for
their clients with the minimum costs.
Even though the availability is not the topic of this case study, it was brought to the
stage because security is part of that precious availability that many enterprises seek to
have permanently, as the one under study for this work. In order to have this
permanent availability it is necessary to invest on the right infrastructure to provide
and secure that infrastructure from viruses and internal/external attacks that can
disrupt their operations as well. The main topic of this case study is network design
and security focused on PCI DSS.
They handle more than 6,000,000 card transactions annually thus they fall under the
category of Level 1 merchants for PCI DSS. They use web servers, application servers
and have multiple databases to run their operations.
As it was mentioned before this organization needs multiple incumbents to access the
data and applications they store and handle: Third-party vendors, customers, business
associates, internal users, etc. This situation creates special requirements for security,
especially because the cardholder environment is not completely isolated from the rest
of the data.
A couple of years ago a transformation process was started for the whole infrastructure
of this organization. This change was not motivated because of PCI DSS, indeed it
started as an effort to reorganize their assets because they inherited an infrastructure
not so well implemented and several issues were occurring due to that particular
situation.
The first step to achieve an optimal network implementation is to study the necessities
on the enterprise environment. This way it is possible to get enough foundation to
make the right decisions about the procedure to follow. Sometimes the reality is that
you are not part of the network-designing project since the very beginning making
impossible that first analyzing step.
19 
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However, analyzing business particularities and constraints if you are part of a
network-redesigning project is also good practice. The original infrastructure of this
organization showed a lack of good analysis for its initial implementation.
Good Network Designing is not a step-by-step generic and well-defined process
applicable to each and every single enterprise or situation even though there are ways
to make network designing a successful project by following the correct steps
(Oppenheimer, 2004), such as:
Analyze requirements
Develop a logical design
Develop the physical design
Test, optimize, and document the design
An optimal network design should provide mechanisms to have the necessary
performance that does not affect the business operations continuity and allows having
a satisfactory service level, it should also scale properly when the business grows and
fit the necessities of the business (Oppenheimer, 2004).
The network in study lacked of the previously mentioned characteristics. Even so, it
has changed dramatically to improve the security and to be more PCI DSS compliant.

5.1.

Regional Situation

Dominican Republic is a country located in the Caribbean. Its economy is highly
dependent on both tourism and remittances. “During the last 12 years remittances
almost triplicate, going from US$1,088.9 millions to US$3,110.7 millions in 2008,
with an average annual growing of 15.5% during that period”(Tinta Criolla, 2009).

20 
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Tourism however still has a leading role on the economy. Each year thousands (near
four millions in 2009(Iglesias, 2010) tourists decide to spend their vacations on the
Island.
If people sending remittances and tourists can feel confident about handling their
transactions in Dominican financial institutions revenues of those activity can keep a
larger growth rhythm, which at the end will benefit not only the financial sector but
also the entire country economy.
Given the fact that PCI DSS is a global data security standard, saying that an
institution is compliant with it, will be captivated by all the customers of that
institution, either national or internationally. This can be considered as an added value
of the PCI DSS compliance and a reason to work continuously into keeping that
compliance.

5.2.

Analysis

A process took place in which all retrieved network diagrams were evaluated against
the real configurations of the network in order to determine the veracity if evolution of
the network presented in the set of diagrams. This analysis was made considering
selected PCI DSS Requirements that are directly related to network designing and
security. In the following Section there is a discussion of what was found.

21 
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6. Network Diagrams Analysis

Figure 1

This diagram dates back from a couple of years ago. It is the first one found in the set
of documentation collected for this case of study and it will be explained in the
following lines. Later on, we will see other diagrams showing the changes that the
network has gone through. This is an attempt to examine and in some cases question
those changes thinking of PCI DSS requirements. The current status of the network
will be presented in the last diagram to evaluate the network status towards achieving
PCI DSS compliance.
Starting from upper left corner the server farm can be seen connected to a core switch
where all users were also connected. Different network segments separate users and
22 
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servers. The access control between them was implemented at the application and
databases level. There was neither a firewall implementation to protect servers from
user access or an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) to analyze traffic flowing between
them. Implementation of Intrusion Prevention Systems is not only a good security
practice but also part of PCI DSS requirements.
In front of the core switch there was an IPS (IPS 1) to monitor traffic going in and out
the most internal part of the network containing servers and users inside. This IPS
seems to be strategically located to inspect every packet going to and coming from
those internal segments, but the truth is that the proxy server they had to control
Internet navigation was connected straight to the Internet (See connector 1). The
traffic going to Internet from any of the segments behind the IPS went directly to the
content switch H3 not passing through the IPS before leaving or entering the internal
segments in that part of the network thus not being monitored.
However, there were two other IPSs (IPS 2 and IPS 3) in each of the ISP connections,
so traffic entering the network was being analyzed in that point anyhow IPSs analyze
traffic based on policies, signatures and traffic patterns learned and configured
through a period of tuning and customization for the intended traffic they will be
monitoring. Thus the policies you have on one IPS might not be effective monitoring
certain type of traffic. In this case, the internal traffic was being analyzed by Internet
IPSs and this could be highly ineffective monitoring.
Web and VPN Servers were behind the firewall it looks like any traffic from the
Internet had to go through the firewall to access them and databases serving web
applications were separated on a DMZ (See DMZ DB). All of these are PCI DSS
Requirements. H3 and H4 (content switches) were being used as DNS servers and so
were H1 and H2 providing redundancy for DNS Services. Even though H3 and H4 had
an interface connected directly to the segment of web servers. If any of them was
compromised there was an open entry to that segment that was supposedly protected
by the firewall.
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Both ISP lines entered to the network going to a hub (See HU1 and HU2). A hub is a
device that repeats received packets into all its ports thus a host connected to the hub
can see traffic that does not necessarily have anything to do with the communication it
is maintaining at a moment. This might allow an intruder “listening” on the channel to
get enough information about a communication session to be able to perform either a
spoofing or a “man in the middle” attack.
There are different connections third party vendors (see Square A, B and C). One of
these connections (See Square C) came from a router directly connected to the same
switch that web servers were connected. There was not an IPS in the middle of this
connection. Traffic coming in and out from that external company was not being
monitored. Firewalls were controlling third party connections to the internal network
(including the one depicted in square C). However there was still the issue that the
switch where that third party was connected had an interface linked to H4 that also
was connected straight to the internal network.
They had two ISP connections, but this facility was not being used for high availability
purposes only one of them was functional for navigation and web services publishing.
This did not work because it was not correctly configured on the equipments and by
that time their availability requirements were not so strict.
There was an interface of FW2 dedicated for a connection of a third party and there
was a server there in that segment also. Lamentably accurate information could not be
retrieved on the purpose of this server. But it was connected in the same switch that
the router connecting the third party vendor (Square B).
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Figure 2

In this diagram we can see that the third party vendor previously seen in square C was
now connected to the switch that the rest of the external companies were connected to
(Square A). This was a good move because all the connections of third parties were
separated on a segment of the network just for them (it will be called an extranet from
now on). The traffic from that third party was controlled by the firewall (FW2) but
traffic could not be monitored, because it was connected to a switch located “before”
the IPS (See box C). Not other considerable changes were made in comparison to the
first diagram.
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Figure 3

A new firewall was added to control access from the internal segments to the DMZ.
PCI DSS requires a firewall between any demilitarized zone and the internal network
but this is not the reason why this firewall was added. Actually the reason was that
some of the firewall implementations were made because it was necessary to have
other interfaces to protect other network segments and the appliances in use did not
provide them.
Other servers were added in the DMZ with the purpose of publishing the web site.
Those servers had three interfaces connected to three different VLANs one in the
segment of the databases; another in the content switch H4 for a connection to the
public network and the 3rd one was used for synchronization among those servers.
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Figure 4

A fourth firewall was added to the infrastructure. This one had two interfaces
connected to the public networks of both ISPs. Another interface was connected to the
internal network. The purpose of adding this firewall is not clear (none of the
contacted personnel had a clear idea on the driving factors for this decision). There is
different information about the reason for this movement but many coincide saying
that it was added because they needed to protect other segments and no interfaces
were available as with the FW3.
Others say it was added to establish a VPN tunnel with a third party vendor. This
tunnel was going to be used for monitoring some specific services from an external
company hired for this. This last affirmation seems more realistic, if we notice that the
firewall had two interfaces into each of the ISP lines and one interface in the internal
network.
27 

Yudit María
MS NSSA Final Project

Eventually two of the existent firewalls (FW1 and FW2) were configured in a cluster
configuration for a high availability (failover).

Figure 5

On the two interfaces of the firewall connecting the extranet there was only one IPS.
This IPS worked for the active line. If a problem occurred in that line, the traffic
monitoring was not performed. This IPS could have been located right after the switch
and before the router (See arrow) to monitor all the traffic, even though this would
leave one of the external companies traffic with no monitoring at all (See Square A).
The workaround to solve that was the creation of two different VLANs on that same
switch, one of the IPS interfaces connected to one of those VLANs and all the routers
for third parties also connected to that VLAN and the other interface of the IPS
connected to the second VLAN were both lines (active and standby) were also
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connected. That way it was possible to monitor any of the lines. Remember the reason
of this workaround is that the IPS only had two interfaces.
At this point the network was becoming too complex and it was too hard to
troubleshoot any issue (a big or an insignificant one) according to the interviewed
personnel.
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Figure 6

Figure 7
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One of the content switches used for DNS is not here anymore. This equipment failed
and was taken out from the network at that moment. A mail server was connected to
the DMZ and to the public network. Two other VPN Boxes were connected to both
ISPs to establish a VPN tunnel with another third party. These VPN Connections
offered the possibility of having dedicated connection at a much lower cost than a
“dedicated line” for example (as it was maintained with other third parties, see
extranet).
Web Services were published only through the connection of the ISP 2. One of the
hubs was disconnected and a switch was left on its place. At this point there was not a
separation between users and servers other than the network segmentation. After this
moment the network dramatically changed to a new configuration considering PCI
DSS requirements.
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Figure 8

Two new firewalls implementation can be seen on this diagram. One of the firewalls
was placed (A) between the Internet and the internal network (PCI DSS Requirement
1.3) and another (B) between the DMZ and the internal zone. This one (B) was also
protecting server’s access from internal users. One of these servers segments protected
by the firewall contained all the equipments that were identified as containers of
cardholder data.
The extranet segment was protected by another cluster of firewalls and an IPS was
located in front of the connection to monitor all traffic coming in and out of that
segment.

Another stand-alone firewall stood to keep the VPN tunnel with the

monitoring service because of compatibility issues (the VPN could not be configured
on external firewalls because those had an ISP Redundancy configuration and the
32 

Yudit María
MS NSSA Final Project

other end equipments did not support this feature). Both firewalls (the cluster and the
stand alone) also protected the internal network of an Internet connection kept with
an ISP. Internal users came either from the main office buildings or from remote sites
connected through a fiber connection or radio transmission. On the line connecting
those remote users two IPSs were placed.
An appliance for analyzing outgoing mail was between two internal servers, this could
be a security vulnerability since this box handles traffic going out to the internet and
any security flaw could be used to compromise it and gain access to the internal
network. Web servers were located in a DMZ and databases in another separated
segment (PCI DSS Requirement 1.3.7). Besides the firewall, a proxy server controlled
access to those web servers, from the internal networks. Those proxy servers security
was hardened by closing all ports not required for its correct operation, disabling
unnecessary services and prohibiting access from not authorized parties, because it
works as a firewall too. Plus the VLAN on the core switch were they connect was a
separate one, created only for them.
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Figure 9

This is the current network status. It has evolved amazingly and the difference since its
initial implementations is tangible. At this point, it seems to be a PCI Compliant
network. It has two firewall implementations protecting the internal network from the
DMZ and the DMZ protected from the Internet. It has IPSs implementations on each
Internet connection and on the connection where remote offices traffic arrives. Public
accessible servers are located in the DMZ and databases accessible by those servers are
located on a separate network segment.
The appliance for analyzing outgoing mail is now located between the DMZ and an
internal segment controlled by the firewalls. A stand-alone firewall implementation
stood to keep a VPN tunnel because of the compatibility issue mentioned before.
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7. Experience and Impact
After analyzing network diagrams and having personnel interviewed several facts can
be discussed in here:

7.1.

Cardholder Environment:

As in any enterprise this company had different environments: Production,
Development and Testing. However, those environments were neither separated nor
controlled. Any server on development and/or testing segment could easily access any
other server from production and vice versa. There were controls at the database level
but not at the network level. An insecure testing or development segment can be the
wide open door through which intruders access your systems.
In the configuration of the network seen on Figure 1, there is not a clear separation of
the cardholder environment from the rest of the applications. For example servers use
to handle card transactions were mixed with the rest of the servers, probably on a
common LAN segment, meaning the access to almost anywhere in the network also
implied access to the cardholder environment.
Servers in production stored, handled and transmitted credit card data, and since
there was not a clear limit on which of those servers in fact handled cardholder data
there was a big issue about the protection of those servers. However, it was also an
issue trying to secure all servers to comply with PCI DSS because there was not a
firewall that could do it at that moment. Eventually all servers were secured with a new
firewall implementation and those handling credit card data were separated on a
network segment only for them.
Any of the collected diagrams described the flow of a card transaction, thus it was
difficult to properly determine which servers were participating on the different types
of card transactions or were storing cardholder information. Some activities were
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performed to try to find out which servers handled critical information related to
cards. For example: They did an application list, containing all those applications used
for the business operations, either from outsiders or in-house developed7. According to
the connections made by those applications either to databases or other servers they
could determine which servers might contain card data. This application classification
was a helpful process to separate the cardholder environment from the rest of the
systems8.
Other activities performed for the process of identification and segmentation of the
cardholder environment:
Interviews with databases administrator and the people handling applications that had
to do with credit cards to discover each possible server used for card transactions.
Observing which of those identified servers had interactions among them (network) or
interacted with other unidentified servers.
A script was run on all machines to verify which of them was storing card data. This
process lasted several weeks because it was a very exhaustive process about 1500
machines.
However it must been said, that cardholder environment is not completely isolated,
and shares many resources with other data. It means that the PCI DSS requirements
affect the entire infrastructure. Because it is considered that all of it is part of the
cardholder environment.

7.2.

Firewall Implementation

The first thing we can see in the network diagrams is that everything is mixed together.
Users and servers coexisted right next to each other under the same environment.
7

The list of applications is included on Appendix B.

Not a complete separation but at least identification of the vast majority of servers containing Cardholder Data or
participate in card transactions
8
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They were segmented in different subnets but there were not other control or
restriction mechanisms to separate them. This created a huge security flaw that could
allow the success of an attack with no need of a big effort. Since the very beginning a
firewall should have been implemented to protect server from internal access. Also
those servers should have been separated among them to prevent any unnecessary and
unauthorized access from one server to another.
The firewall configuration was poorly implemented. It had a DMZ protecting the
database segment from public access but the web servers were not protected because
they were reachable without having to go through the firewall.

PCI DSS first

requirement establishes:
Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to
protect cardholder data.
1.2 Build a firewall configuration that restricts connections between
untrusted networks and any system components in the cardholder data
environment.
Their proxy server navigated to the outside (internet) going directly from the internal
network without having to go pass through the firewalls. This is not compliant with
PCI DSS requirement 1.1.3 that establishes the use of a firewall at each Internet
Connection (See Appendix A for more Details on PCI DSS requirements).

7.3.

Network and Infrastructure

One of the content switches had a direct connection to the internal network (check H3
on the Diagram 1). These layer 4-7 communication equipments were used as DNS
servers. They were publicly accessible and one of them had a direct connection to the
internal network containing servers and users.
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The core switch implementation was not homogeneous with the rest of the
communication equipments implementation. The management of this core
implementation became more and more unfeasible because the local personnel were
not properly trained and the administration of those equipments was allegedly
difficult. This situation created a dependency of the vendors of those equipments that
was creating problems whenever any particular situation appeared and a
troubleshooting was required.
The servers network interface cards only supported 10/100 Mbps speed. It worked
correctly during many years. However, at some point the business was growing
considerably and needs changed. The appearance of new applications, services and
users, increased traffic being handled and the demand of resources to function
properly also went up. So they thought it was a right move to: 1. Increase the links’
capabilities to 1000Mbps Links and 2. Migrate all NICs on each server to process a
higher amount of packets and handle more traffic to take advantage of this higher
capacity.
But, were they really conscious on how much they should have increased NICs
capabilities or links speed? According to information provided by the personnel
working that part, no. Even with applications demanding more and users being added
to the company, the network performance did not reach unbearable levels for the
business operations. Add to this was the fact that the business did not have a clearly
defined network performance goal. There were no metrics on how the performance
was on that time or how the network utilization was behaving to support the decision
of increasing everything (including costs).
Links capacity was increased, because the network was becoming “slow”. They
changed their links capabilities pretty much in an intuitive/perceptive move not
supported by the corresponding analysis and metrics captures. At the end it came out
to be a good move. Because they did continue growing but also they still face issues

38 

Yudit María
MS NSSA Final Project

with the performance of the network especially for some specific LAN segments were
hundreds of servers are contained.
When changes to the servers and links were implemented, it came up that other
equipments in the infrastructure appeared not to be capable of handling 1000Mbps
links, and they started saturating the network causing disruptions on the
communication of the different parts of the network. Those were the IPSs
implementation (Intrusion Prevention Systems). Those IPSs were strategically moved
to other segments of the network where they still provided protection without affecting
performance (See figure 8).
Unfortunately all this decisions and upgrades because of performance issues were not
properly documented and analyzed. There is no information saved from those days
that can support the alleged theories of the reason why those changes of speed were
made.

7.4.

Access Control

The information that is to be accessed by users of the complete company is centralized
and located within network segments that also handle critical information such as
cardholder data. Which makes access control more critical.
Databases were distributed among multiple servers.

Databases serving distinct

applications were stored in different locations. Even if those databases had common
elements. This caused unnecessary information duplicity. Furthermore, those servers
lacked of redundancy in the case of a failure. There were several databases storing
cardholder data spread along the network.
The encryption equipments (encryption key holders) were accessible from anywhere in
the network.

Later on with the latest firewall implementation and due to their

criticality, they were segmented on an interface of the firewalls dedicated only to them,
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which was a great step for PCI DSS that has requirements for Key Management, even
though this part is not being considered on this case study (PCI DSS Requirement 3.5).

In the following lines there will be a discussion of the analysis made of the
implementations,

considering

the

standard

requirements.

The

application

requirements will be also discussed, because even though they are not part of the
networking and infrastructure they are a very important topic on the standard.

Requirement 6: Developing and Maintaining Secure Applications and
Systems
PCI DSS has requirements for securing payment card applications and systems. A
walk through each of the requirements evaluating them against the current situation
will clarify the position of the institution towards the standard compliance.
Requirement 6.1 is about updates and latest patch. In this company there is a policy
that establishes the implementation of updates and patches but it is limited only to a
certain platform. Thus the updates and patches policy is not applicable to another
software and applications. Although the firewall policy, for example, establishes that
they must updated to the latest software version and have the latest updates and/or
corrections released by the vendors. However, there is not a general updates and
patches application policy establishing, among other things, a timeframe required for
this updating activity. According to PCI DSS most recent patches and updates must be
applied not later than 30 days after its release. Also, there is not a process to identify
newly discovered security vulnerabilities affecting applications different from web
applications specific vulnerabilities.
Requirement 6.3: Developing software application in accordance to PCI DSS and
based on industry best practices. For software development, there is an established
process that includes points like validation of data inputs, error handling (for example
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errors referring to login methods (Requirement 6.3.1.2) do not provide an explicit
explanation of the failure cause, generic error messages for any application errors,
etc.). However, in this process there is not a validation for the use of secure
communications methods requirement (Requirement 6.3.1.4), for example. There is
not an auditing of the coding for applications developed in-house or used from
externals; activities contemplated on the development established process are not
evaluated for applications bought from outside.
The test, production and development environments are separated and partially
controlled (Requirement 6.3.2). There is not a duty separation between tests,
development and production environments (Requirement 6.3.3), developers do have
access to production environment.

Connections are kept from development to

production, and from test to production and test to development.

Having those

connections is necessary because otherwise the development and test activities could
be completely stopped since there are functionalities existent only on production and
any new development for those cases implies using the production environment. This
also happens for several applications that do not have a dedicated test environment.
Correcting this implies the creation of the three separated environments for each and
every single application and/or system, which can provide an enhancement on
security, but it might also cost a considerable amount of money.
Primary Account Numbers in production are still used for test and development for
some applications (Requirement 6.3.4). This is a consequence of the lack of separation
on the different environments (Production, Test and Development).
Requirements 6.3.5 and 6.3.6 for removing data before a system is released to
production is not established as a requirement. It is done in some cases but not
because is an obligation.
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There is not a coding revision since there are not personnel responsible for this.
Developers freely create applications following the best practices, but nobody certifies
this.
There are changes control procedures (Requirement 6.4) documented both through
automated applications and manually created, however there is not an exhaustive
documentation of changes impact (Requirement 6.4.1) because is not required thus is
obviated in documentation of changes control.

There is a provision to have

appropriate management sign-off (Requirement 6.4.2), testing (Requirement 6.4.3)
and back-out procedures (Requirement 6.4.4) with the use of written documents to
implement changes.
All web applications are tested (Requirement 6.5 and 6.6) by the testing personnel and
controlled by integrity personnel. There are dedicated teams for those tasks. Each
application is also tested with different automated tools to validate the security against
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), SQL Injection, Xpath Injection, Malicious File Execution,
etc. However the process is informal, does not have a written procedure or policy
requesting so. There is not a specific requirement of using a web-application firewall
(Requirement 6.6) for publicly accessible web applications but host IPS installed on
web servers fulfill this requirement.

Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business needto-know
Access restriction to cardholder data cannot be checked as performed completely
successfully because cardholder data resides not only on specific servers and
databases; it is also contained in file texts, physical paper/documents, e-mails and so
on.
The control implemented in computing systems is the creation of profiles with explicit
access limitations based on the type of work performed by an individual (Requirement
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7.1.29 and 7.2.2). There is no written requirement on a form to configure an access, or
to elevate the privileges of a user, but the compensation measures is the requirement
of an email from the superior authorizing the access (Requirement 7.1.3).

Requirement 10: Track and monitor all access to network resources
and cardholder data
Since each username in the network is created for a specific user it is possible to link
all access to an individual user (Requirement 10.2). The mechanism to control that
each user is unique is through the use of both personal IDs and employee number
assigned at the moment of hiring someone.
There are applications for log consolidation. There are logs activated on every database
to keep track of any changes performed on the systems (Requirement 10.2): individual
accesses, invalid access attempts, initialization of the audit logs, among other
activities. They use 3 applications to satisfy this particular point of the standard.
Those tools were approved to be PCI Compliant, however, the personnel handling
those tools must be highly trained in the use, because they not only do track and
monitoring as require by PCI in part 10, but also can impact the performance of the
systems being monitored.
The time synchronization still lacks of a dedicated server for these purposes. This is
critical because in the occurrence of an event it will not be possible to correlate logging
and audit trails to perform an investigation.
There is a log server dedicated only for this purposes it is controlled through the
firewall. But backups of this server do not have any special security requirement
(Requirement 10.5.3). Those automated tools control logs Integrity. Alerts are
generated whenever data is altered.
9

Numbers with this nomenclature refer to standard requirements subsections and can be checked on Appendix A.
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There is not a policy establishing the timeframe for storing logs (Requirement 10.7),
and the required availability of those logs.

Requirement 11: Regularly test security systems and processes
Wireless Access Points are non-existent within this enterprise, but there is not a
formal requirement and/or procedure for periodically testing the presence of wireless
access points (Requirement 11.1). It is known that an illegitimate access point can be
introduced either by an internal employee or by a customer taking advantage of lack of
security at a certain point.
There is not a formal procedure establishing the frequency of network vulnerability
scans. It is not required to do vulnerability assessment after major changes on the
network. However the personnel responsible of the network security perform this task
at least twice a month being this is a particular initiative. It should be established as a
formal procedure for security reasons and to comply with Requirement 11.2 of the
standard.
Penetration Tests both internal and external are established as a policy (Requirement
11.3). However there is not a procedure to implement corrections to vulnerabilities
found on those penetration tests. This should be done according to PCI DSS
requirements.
IPSs (Intrusion Prevention Systems) are implemented to monitor traffic coming in
going out of the network. These systems are configured to emit alerts low, medium or
high. Those alerts are sent to a 24x7x365 monitoring team. IPSs are configured with a
policy containing a number of signatures to detect different type of possible attacks.
The policy is continuously tuned to include the largest amount of firms to detect
several different attacks. This IPSs use different methods to detect and prevent
intrusion such as port assignment, heuristics, port following, protocol tunneling,
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protocol analysis, RFC compliance, TCP Reassembly, Flow Reassembly, and Statistical
Analysis and pattern Matching (Rouland, 2004).

Those devices are constantly

updated but there is not a formal requirement for this. There are network IPS and host
based IPS to monitor the traffic over servers considered critical, sensitive and
containers of cardholder data (Requirement 11.5).
File integrity monitoring is inspected by two software applications but it was not
possible to get details on this point.

7.5.

Costs

The whole implementation of micro and macro projects for PCI DSS compliance
purposes ascended to almost a million dollars for this company. Remember this is a
level one company transacting with more than six millions credit cards annually and
total benefits over 16 million dollars10. This might sound as a high cost for a “security
project” but it is worth the value if the repercussions of having fines and eventually
losing the right to negotiate with card brands are considered. Card transactions are
part of the most profitable activities for a company like this one of the type being used
in this case study.

Solution
Antivirus
Logging and events correlation tools
Two Factor Authentication Solution
(Tokens)
Database Security Auditing Software (Active
Blocking)

Requirement

Cost
US$90,000.00
US $100,000.00

8.2 - 8.3

US $30,000.00

10.2 Y 10.3

US $200,000.00

Web Applications Security Assessment tools
External Assessors: Gap Analysis, Internal
and External Penetration Tests.
Data Loss Prevention Solution
External assessors for correcting internal

6.3

US $32,000.00

10

US $100,000.00
US$70,000.00
US $50,000.00

This are general gains, no statistics about gains only because of card transactions could be gathered
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External assessors for correcting internal
(in-house developed) applications
Internal and External Firewalls
Network and Host Based IPSs
Firewall solution for virtual servers
TOTAL

US $50,000.00
US $200,000.00
US $90,000.00
US$25,000.00
$987,000.00

Is important considering that this is an initial investment, this might make it seems as
extremely high, but after this, there should be less costs for keeping the compliance
status.
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8. Findings and Results
In general security has three important stages:
Policy creation: to regulate the correct use of resources
Infrastructure implementation: to ensure the policies are being followed
Alertness: to evaluate how effective the implementation. Also, to consider
whether new changes are necessary to improve security.
It can be affirmed that PCI DSS also considers those stages. The standard is not only
about implementing solutions for security, data loss prevention antivirus or
encryption, just to name a few. It is also about documenting those implementations as
well as creating policies and making users aware or them.
This particular company has made a big effort about policy creation. They currently
have

policies

for

password

management,

firewall

installation,

information

classification, antivirus software, access control, and secure application designing and
information security in general.
For example the configuration norm for firewalls being used include requirements for:
•

Changing the default usernames and passwords, with a password that complies
with the robustness required by the password policy.

•

Configuring the equipments to synchronize with a central NTP Server (Network
Time Protocol). This is important in case of an event occurrence logs and data
to be analyzed and correlated properly in the considered timeframe for
auditing.

•

Stateful Inspection of packets and connections and anti-spoofing mechanisms
to be enabled. This provides the possibility of reducing the risk of attacks
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through illegitimate connections and false traffic sources impersonating legal
ones.
•

Key exchange encryption, data integrity and data encryption for VPN (Virtual
Private Network Settings) to be made implementing protocols and algorithms
such as IPSec, IKE, AES128 and AES256.

•

Configurations requirements for blocking all traffic (deny all) by default.

•

Disabling of routing services on the firewalls

•

Proper configurations for SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol)
including proper community settings and specified host from whom SNMP
requests can be accepted.

•

Requirements of justifications to enable rules allowing services and protocols
not commonly known.

•

Restrictions of ICMP traffic.

•

Configurations of banners displaying messages alerting the access to secure and
restricted equipment which use is auditable and intended to be accessed only by
authorized personnel.

•

Restriction of accesses to the equipment from anywhere in the network by
default. Only authorized personnel can have the access and only through a
secure protocol such as SSL.

•

Only SFTP should be allowed. In case of inevitable requirement of FTP
configuration allowance this connections must be restricted to specific servers
from specific machines.

•

Configuration of NAT rule to protect disclosure of internal network IP
addresses.

•

All servers accessible from the outside should be placed on a DMZ.

•

Any access to the exterior will be restricted by default.

•

Logging requirement for any connection except those of SNMP protocol
generating trivial and excessive amount of traffic.
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•

Restrictions of certain services and ports11 unless they are strictly required by
business activities.

•

Analysis of SMTP traffic.

•

Enabling of TCPSYN defenses.

However they do not have a configuration norm for routers and communication
equipments. This point is being currently worked out.
There is a firewall implementation on each Internet connection and between the DMZ
and the internal network. This firewall implementation is on a high availability
configuration to ensure business continuity. But in the firewall configuration norm
there is not an explicit requirement for this type of configuration, which is required by
the standard.
They also have a formal process for approving and testing connections through the
firewall (Requirement 1.1.112). This formal process includes the completion of a form
with the source and destination IP addresses, the protocol and service, justification
and systems being affected by the required access. The correspondent administrative
personnel in the security department evaluate this form and approve or disapprove it.
A current network diagram is kept for the general infrastructure. This diagram is
updated every time a change in the network is performed. However they do not have a
detailed connection diagram representing connections to the cardholder environment
(Requirement 1.1.2).

They do not have a diagram describing the flow of card

connections whenever a transaction is performed. This flow is not completely
identified for some activities (for some other it is).

11

12

Explicit Description of the services and ports has been omitted for privacy
See Appendix A for details on the requirements
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In the configuration policy there is a description of groups and roles for the
management of the firewalls. In there it is clearly explained who is responsible for
what, creating an adequate limitation/restriction of authorized people that can make
changes on the firewalls (this is not applicable to all network components as required
in 1.1.4).
Within the firewall configuration norm there is a description of specific ports and
services allowed for the business operations but this list is not exhaustive. It needs to
be completed and more detailed. There are common ports and services such as (HTTP,
HTTPS or SSH) and some others not that common that are part of business specific
applications (this part is still incomplete). There is a requirement of documenting
which of those protocols and services is insecure and that is also incomplete. It
requires an analysis for identified protocols and services that has not been made yet.
(Requirement 1.1.5).
Requirement 1.1.6 establishes a review of firewall and routers rules at least every six
months. This is not established on any of the policies or configuration norms and
there is not a defined formal process to complete this activity.
Connection to critical servers containing cardholder data is restricted. Inbound and
outbound traffic to those servers network segment is strictly controlled with the
requirement of proper justification. However cardholder data environment is not
restricted only to those servers. Any intermediate host that this data goes through is
part of the cardholder data environment and some of those hosts probably cannot be
restricted as much as those servers. So there is an issue in here about the “restriction
to what is necessary for the cardholder environment” point established on
Requirement 1.2.1.
The personnel in charge of handling it back up router configuration files periodically.
Configuration files are also collected daily with the use of the monitoring tool. But
there is not a secure repository specifically destined to store all this backups in a
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secure manner. They are not properly synchronized either, it means that the
configuration running on equipment is not verified against the backed up
configuration after a reboot for example. (Requirement 1.2.2)
Requirement 1.2.3. Wireless traffic to the cardholder environment is controlled and
restricted to the specified servers identified to be handling cardholder data, and also to
databases containing cardholder data as well. But it is not possible saying that wireless
access is completely controlled to the cardholder environment, because of what was
previously explained of this environment scope. It is important to note that this
company only has wireless links to support transmissions of high amounts of data
among its different branches. They do not have wireless Acces Points.
Direct access to the Internet is prohibited (Requirement 1.3) There is a DMZ created
for any of those services accessible by the public and controlled by the firewall
(Requirement 1.3.1), any access from the internet only goes to servers contained within
that DMZ. Accesses from internal IP addresses coming from the Internet (1.3.4) are
prohibited through specific rules configuration in the external firewalls (this is
established on the configuration norm of the firewalls).
No direct routes (1.3.3) are configured between the Internet and the servers and
databases containing cardholder data. Actually there is a firewall protecting those
servers and databases. Any connection to those segments is highly restricted by that
firewall implementation.
Cardholder data container servers and databases do not pass traffic directly to the
Internet. Any data going out to the Internet first goes to a protected segment. These
servers can only access IP addresses within that segment (Requirement 1.3.5).
However some of those servers still access Internet addresses because of business
necessities. The compensation control for this is that the access is restricted to a
specific IP address through a specific port.
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Stateful inspection is implemented for all connections through the network
(Requirement 1.3.6). Databases to be accessed for services published for outsiders are
on a segment separated from the DMZ and separated from the internal network as
well. (Requirement 1.3.7). NAT (Network Addressing Translation) is used for Internal
IP addresses going to the Internet or to any third party.
Installation of personal firewall on any laptop is established as a policy but some
personnel using laptops can disable the firewall and this is not controlled by a policy.
Disk Encryption is being implemented as part of an end point security solution also
required for laptops.
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9. Recommendations
They should create a configuration norm for routers and communication equipments
configuration norm. Methods of enforcing the application of the norm should be
created.
There should be a correction on the updates and patches policy:
•

To make it extensive to the whole system components

•

To establish the minimum timeframe in which the updates must be applied.

•

To include a structured procedure to audit the updates activities.

Personnel in charge of reviewing code on used applications should be hired (There is
neither a person nor a department responsible of this activity).
Production, Test and Development environments should be isolated. This might have
a high cost depending on the system or application being separated. But an insecure
test and/or development environments can give access to an intruder to production
systems causing a data breach. There should be an evaluation on how much you can
invest on securing and separating those environments and find ways to handle that
security the most cost efficient possible and without interrupting business operations.
They should create a policy for separating duties between production, test and
development personnel, and educate the personnel to not incurring in activities that
they are not authorized to do even if they have enough power to do it (because in some
cases there is not possible to restrict users for operations’ sake).
Primary Account Number in production could be scrambled or use an algorithm
method to convert PAN data into fictitious values to be used in test and development.
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There should be a consideration of changing these values on any test/development
system/application where they appeared.
There should be a paragraph on the policy for production date requiring the
elimination of test data. Another paragraph should be added for changes control
requiring a measure of impact the changes can have over the entire infrastructure.
Procedures to perform web-applications assessment should be formally instituted.
Requiring the use of both automated tools and manual verification.
Centralized Log Server should be backed up in another server controlled by the
firewall and in tapes stored in a physically controlled location and backups should be
created daily, weekly and monthly.
Creation of a log and log backup policy, specifying the period of time that logs must be
available for immediate use (3 months minimum according to the standard), and the
total period for keeping system logs (at least one year to comply with the standards).
Implementation of wireless analyzers to detect illegitimate access points should be
considered and a formal process to perform this activity. Also keep a log providing
constancy of when it is done.
Whenever a Penetration Test is performed there must be a requirement to implement
corrections in a minimum timeframe. In case the correction involves long-term
activities this should be planned, projected and start to be executed in the minor time
possible. Especially for high or medium vulnerabilities.
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10. Conclusions
PCI DSS Compliance is not a project, is a transformation process. Your first link on
that process is the user (as in almost every system). They have to be actively
participants on the security schema. They have to know policies. And you should
encourage and motivate them to work under those policies as well as make the security
team aware of any particular situation that they considered is violating PCI DSS
mandates.
You can have all policies and procedures well designed, established and easily
accessible but if there are not enforcement mechanisms it is possible that the vast
majority will not follow those guides. It is not that you will turn your organization into
a military base, but you must find a way to make users follow policies. Or even better
keep them motivated to do it.
You should never use a technology if do not have the expertise on your personnel to
manage and troubleshoot this technology. If despite of not having the required
knowledge on the personnel you are still willing to use the technology, considering an
outsourcing option. Make sure this outsourcing is a 100% available depending on how
critical the implementation is, and the impact it can have on your business if it fails.
If you get the compliance you should work actively on maintain it. It is not enough to
have deployed a well-designed network and security infrastructure that probably cost
you a lot of money. You should constantly keep track on what is happening on that
infrastructure and how are changes being handled and documented. This might be
overwhelming if you infrastructure is big enough, but you should find the most
adequate methods to do this. Either by using automated tools of by having personnel
dedicated only to this purposes. This might be costly but it would be more costly losing
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the compliance status or even worst having your business involved in a case of data
breach.
Achieving PCI DSS can be very expensive depending on which point the company is.
But it can be more expensive to face a security breach case for not being compliant.
However this compliant status does not ensure that you have a secure infrastructure
but at least means that you are following well-known security best practices for specific
sensitive data as cardholder data is.
Being compliant gives you a wildcard in case you have a data breach case. Also the
brands have economical incentives for that who are compliant, and even more
attractive is the fact that the company can be listed as PCI compliant, which will be
known by all the people that do business with the company. This is a good boost for in
terms of reputation.
By October 2010 the PCI Security Standards Council will release a new version of the
standard. New technological advances offer the possibility of enhancing security in any
sector, but also posse a higher risk of having data compromised, this will be considered
for the modifications that will be introduced to the standard. For example, chip and
pin technologies, end-to-end encryption and tokenization(Westervelt, 2010) are part
of the technologies that might be considered for the new version of the standard.
Cloud (Westervelt, 2010) computing and virtualization are relatively new fields that
still have several security issues to be solved but are being widely implemented.
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11. Glossary
PCI DSS: Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard.
Phishing: a social engineering method where the attacker makes a victim believe that
is the legitimate person/business and ask for confidential information either
electronically or by phone).
PAN: Principal Account Number
PIN: Personal Identification Number entered by cardholder during a card-present
transaction, and/or encrypted PIN block present within the transaction message
NAT: Network Addressing Translation
NTP: Network Time Protocol
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Appendix A
PCI DSS Requirement: Regular Letters
Testing Procedures to ensure compliance with the requirement: Italic Letters
1.1. A formal process for approving and testing all network connections and changes to the firewall
and router configurations.
1.1.1. Verify that there is a formal process for testing and approval of all network connections
and changes to firewall and router configurations.
1.1.2 Current network diagram with all connections to cardholder data, including any wireless
networks.
1.1.2.a Verify that a current network diagram (for example, one that shows cardholder data
flows over the network) exists and that it documents all connections to cardholder data,
including any wireless networks.
1.1.2.b Verify that the diagram is kept current.
1.1.3 Requirements for a firewall at each Internet connection and between any demilitarized zone
(DMZ) and the internal network zone
1.1.3 Verify that firewall configuration standards include requirements for a firewall at each
Internet connection and between any DMZ and the internal network zone. Verify that the
current network diagram is consistent with the firewall configuration standards.
1.1.5 Documentation and business justification for use of all services, protocols, and ports
allowed, including documentation of security features implemented for those protocols
considered to be insecure.
1.1.5.a Verify that firewall and router configuration standards include a documented list of
services, protocols and ports necessary for business—for example, hypertext transfer protocol
(HTTP) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Secure Shell (SSH), and Virtual Private Network
(VPN) protocols.
1.1.5.b Identify insecure services, protocols, and ports allowed; and verify they are necessary
and that security features are documented and implemented by examining firewall and router
configuration standards and settings for each service. An example of an insecure service,
protocol, or port is FTP, which passes user credentials in clear-text.
1.2 Build a firewall configuration that restricts connections between untrusted networks and any system
components in the cardholder data environment.
Note: An “untrusted network” is any network that is external to the networks belonging to the entity
under review, and/or which is out of the entity's ability to control or manage.
1.2 Examine firewall and router configurations to verify that connections are restricted between
untrusted networks and system components in the cardholder data environment, as follows:
1.2.1 Restrict inbound and outbound traffic to that which is necessary for the cardholder data
environment.
1.2.1.a Verify that inbound and outbound traffic is limited to that which is necessary for
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the cardholder data environment, and that the restrictions are documented.
1.2.1.b Verify that all other inbound and outbound traffic is specifically denied, for
example by using explicit “deny all” or an implicit deny after allow statement.
1.2.2 Secure and synchronize router configuration files.
1.2.2 Verify that router configuration files are secure and synchronized—for example,
running configuration files (used for normal running of the routers) and start-up
configuration files (used when machines are re-booted), have the same, secure
configurations.
1.2.3 Install perimeter firewalls between any wireless networks and the cardholder data
environment, and configure these firewalls to deny or control (if such traffic is necessary for
business purposes) any traffic from the wireless environment into the cardholder data
environment.
1.2.3 Verify that there are perimeter firewalls installed between any wireless networks
and systems that store cardholder data, and that these firewalls deny or control (if such
traffic is necessary for business purposes) any traffic from the wireless environment into
the cardholder data environment.
1.3 Prohibit direct public access between the Internet and any system component in
the cardholder data environment.
1.3 Examine firewall and router configurations, as detailed below, to determine that there is no
direct access between the Internet and system components, including the choke router at the
Internet, the DMZ router and firewall, the DMZ cardholder segment, the perimeter router, and
the internal cardholder network segment.
1.3.1 Implement a DMZ to limit inbound and outbound traffic to only protocols that are
necessary for the cardholder data environment.
1.3.1 Verify that a DMZ is implemented to limit inbound and outbound traffic to
only protocols that are
necessary for the cardholder data environment.
1.3.2 Limit inbound Internet traffic to IP addresses within the DMZ.
1.3.2 Verify that inbound Internet traffic is limited to IP addresses within the DMZ.
1.3.3 Do not allow any direct routes inbound or outbound for traffic between the Internet
and the cardholder data environment.
1.3.3 Verify there is no direct route inbound or outbound for traffic between the
Internet and the cardholder data environment.
1.3.4 Do not allow internal addresses to pass from the Internet into the DMZ.
1.3.4 Verify that internal addresses cannot pass from the Internet into the DMZ.
1.3.5 Restrict outbound traffic from the cardholder data environment to the Internet such
that outbound traffic can only access IP addresses within the DMZ.
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1.3.5 Verify that outbound traffic from the cardholder data environment to the
Internet can only access IP addresses within the DMZ.
1.3.6 Implement stateful inspection, also known as dynamic packet filtering. (That is, only
”established” connections are allowed into the network.)
1.3.6 Verify that the firewall performs stateful inspection (dynamic packet filtering).
[Only established connections should be allowed in, and only if they are associated
with a previously established session (run a port scanner on all TCP ports with “syn
reset” or ”syn ack” bits set—a response means packets are allowed through even if
they are not part of a previously established session).]
1.3.7 Place the database in an internal network zone, segregated from the DMZ.
1.3.7 Verify that the database is on an internal network zone, segregated from the
DMZ.
1.3.8 Implement IP masquerading to prevent internal addresses from being translated and
revealed on the Internet, using RFC 1918 address space. Use network address translation
(NAT) technologies—for example, port address translation (PAT).
1.3.8 For the sample of firewall and router components, verify that NAT or other
technology using RFC 1918 address space is used to restrict broadcast of IP addresses
from the internal network to the Internet (IP masquerading).
1.4 Install personal firewall software on any mobile and/or employee-owned computers
with direct connectivity to the Internet (for example, laptops used by employees), which are
used to access the Organization’s network.
1.4.a Verify that mobile and/or employee-owned computers with direct connectivity
to the Internet (for example, laptops used by employees), and which are used to access
the organization’s network, have personal firewall software installed and active.
1.4.b Verify that the personal firewall software is configured by the organization to
specific standards and is not alterable by mobile computer users.
6.1 Ensure that all system components and software have the latest vendor-supplied security patches
installed. Install critical security patches within one month of release. Note: An organization may
consider applying a risk-based approach to prioritize their patch installations. For example, by
prioritizing critical infrastructure (for example, public-facing devices and systems, databases) higher
than less-critical internal devices, to ensure high-priority systems and devices are addressed within one
month, and addressing less critical devices and systems within three months.
6.1.a For a sample of system components and related software, compare the list of security
patches installed on each system to the most recent vendor security patch list, to verify that
current vendor patches are installed.
6.1.b Examine policies related to security patch installation to verify they require installation
of all critical new security patches within one month.
6.2 Establish a process to identify newly discovered security vulnerabilities (for example, subscribe to
alert services freely available on the Internet). Update configuration standards as required by PCI DSS
Requirement 2.2 to address new vulnerability issues.
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6.2.a Interview responsible personnel to verify that processes are implemented to identify
new security vulnerabilities.
6.2.b Verify that processes to identify new security vulnerabilities include using outside
sources for security vulnerability information and updating the system configuration
standards reviewed in Requirement 2.2 as new vulnerability issues are found.
6.3 Develop software applications in accordance with PCI DSS (for example, secure authentication and
logging) and based on industry best practices, and incorporate information security throughout the
software development life cycle.
6.3.a Obtain and examine written software development processes to verify that the
processes are based on industry standards, security is included throughout the life cycle, and
software applications are developed in accordance with PCI DSS.
6.3.b From an examination of written software development processes, interviews of
software developers, and examination of relevant data (network configuration
documentation, production and test data, etc.
6.3.1 Testing of all security patches, and system and software configuration changes before
deployment.
6.3.1 All changes (including patches) are tested before being deployed into production.
6.3.1.1 Validation of all input (to prevent cross-site scripting, injection flaws,
malicious file execution, etc.)
6.3.1.2 Validation of proper error handling
6.3.1.3 Validation of secure cryptographic storage
6.3.1.4 Validation of secure communications
6.3.1.5 Validation of proper role-based access control (RBAC)
6.3.2 Separate development/test and production environments
6.3.2 The development/test environments are separate from the production
environment, with access control in place to enforce the separation.
6.3.3 Separation of duties between development/test and production environments
6.3.3 There is a separation of duties between personnel assigned to the
development/test environments and those assigned to the production environment.
6.3.4 Production data (live PANs) are not used for testing or development
6.3.4 Production data (live PANs) are not used for testing and development, or are
sanitized before use.
6.3.5 Removal of test data and accounts before production systems become active
6.3.5 Test data and accounts are removed before a production system becomes active.
6.3.6 Removal of custom application accounts, user IDs, and passwords before applications
become active or are released to customers
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6.3.6 Custom application accounts, user IDs and/or passwords are removed before
system goes into production or is released to customers.
6.3.7 Review of custom code prior to release to production or customers in order to identify any
potential coding vulnerability Note: This requirement for code reviews applies to all custom
code (both internal and public-facing), as part of the system development life cycle required by
PCI DSS Requirement 6.3. Code reviews can be conducted by knowledgeable internal personnel
or third parties. Web applications are also subject to additional controls, if they are public
facing, to address ongoing threats and vulnerabilities after implementation, as defined at PCI
DSS Requirement 6.6.
6.3.7.a Obtain and review policies to confirm all custom application code changes for
internal applications must be reviewed (either using manual or automated processes), as
follows:
•
•
•

Code changes are reviewed by individuals other then the originating code author, and
by individuals who are knowledgeable in code review techniques and secure coding
practices.
Appropriate corrections are implemented prior to release.
Code review results are reviewed and approved by management prior to release.

6.3.7.b Obtain and review policies to confirm that all custom application code changes for web
applications must be reviewed (using either manual or automated processes) as follows:
•
•
•
•

Code changes are reviewed by individuals other then the originating code author, and
by individuals who are knowledgeable in code review techniques and secure coding
practices.
Code reviews ensure code is developed according to secure coding guidelines such as
the Open Web Security Project Guide (see PCI DSS Requirement 6.5).
Appropriate corrections are implemented prior to release.
Code review results are reviewed and approved by management prior to release.

6.3.7.c Select a sample of recent custom application changes and verify that custom application
code is reviewed according to 6.3.7a and 6.3.7b above.
6.4 Follow change control procedures for all changes to system components.
6.4.a Obtain and examine company change-control procedures related to implementing
security patches and software modifications, and verify that the procedures require items
6.4.1 – 6.4.4 below.
6.4.b For a sample of system components and recent changes/security patches, trace those
changes back to related change control documentation.

6.4.1 Documentation of impact
6.4.1 Verify that documentation of customer impact is included in the change control
documentation for each sampled change.
6.4.2 Management sign-off by appropriate parties
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6.4.2 Verify that management sign-off by appropriate parties is present for each
sampled change.
6.4.3 Testing of operational functionality
6.4.3 Verify that operational functionality testing is performed for each sampled
change.
6.4.4 Back-out procedures
6.4.4 Verify that back-out procedures are prepared for each sampled change
6.5 Develop all web applications (internal and external, and including web administrative access to
application) based on secure coding guidelines such as the Open Web Application Security Project
Guide. Cover prevention of common coding vulnerabilities in software development processes, to
include the following: Note: The vulnerabilities listed at 6.5.1 through 6.5.10 were current in the OWASP
guide when PCI DSS v1.2 was published. However, if and when the OWASP guide is updated, the
current version must be used for these requirements.
6.5.a Obtain and review software development processes for any web-based applications. Verify
that processes require training in secure coding techniques for developers, and are based on
guidance such as the OWASP guide (http://www.owasp.org).
6.5.b Interview a sample of developers and obtain evidence that they are knowledgeable in
secure coding techniques.
6.5.c Verify that processes are in place to ensure that web applications are not vulnerable to the
following:
6.5.1 Cross-site scripting (XSS)
6.5.1 Cross-site scripting (XSS) (Validate all parameters before inclusion.)
6.5.2 Injection flaws, particularly SQL injection. Also consider LDAP and Xpath injection flaws
as well as other injection flaws.
6.5.2 Injection flaws, particularly SQL injection (Validate input to verify user data
cannot modify meaning of commands and queries.)
6.5.3 Malicious file execution
6.5.3 Malicious file execution (Validate input to verify application does not accept
filenames or files from users.)
6.5.4 Insecure direct object references
6.5.4 Insecure direct object references (Do not expose internal object references to
users.)
6.5.5 Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
6.5.5 Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) (Do not reply on authorization credentials and
tokens automatically submitted by browsers.)
6.5.6 Information leakage and improper error handling

66 

Yudit María
MS NSSA Final Project
6.5.6 Information leakage and improper error handling. (Do not leak information via
error messages or other means.)
6.5.7 Broken authentication and session management
6.5.7 Broken authentication and session management (Properly authenticate users and
protect account credentials and session tokens.)
6.5.8 Insecure cryptographic storage
6.5.8 Insecure cryptographic storage (Prevent cryptographic flaws.)
6.5.9 Insecure communications
6.5.9 Insecure communications (Properly encrypt all authenticated and sensitive
communications.)
6.5.10 Failure to restrict URL access
6.5.10 Failure to restrict URL access (Consistently enforce access control in
presentation layer and business logic for all URLs.)
6.6 For public-facing web applications, address new threats and vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis and
ensure these applications are protected against known attacks by either of the following methods:
•
•

Reviewing public-facing web applications via manual or automated application
vulnerability security assessment tools or methods, at least annually and after any
changes
Installing a web-application firewall in front of public-facing web applications

6.6 For public-facing web applications, ensure that either one of the following methods are in
place as follows:
•

Verify that public-facing web applications are reviewed (using either manual or
automated vulnerability security assessment tools or methods), as follows:
-

•

At least annually
After any changes
By an organization that specializes in application security
That all vulnerabilities are corrected
That the application is re-evaluated after the corrections

Verify that a web-application firewall is in place in front of public-facing web
applications to detect and prevent web-based attacks. Note: “An organization that
specializes in application security” can be either a third-party company or an
internal organization, as long as the reviewers specialize in application security and
can demonstrate independence from the development team.

7.1 Limit access to system components and cardholder data to only those individuals whose job requires
such access.
7.1 Obtain and examine written policy for data control, and verify that the policy.
7.1.1 Restriction of access rights to privileged user IDs to least privileges necessary to
perform job responsibilities
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7.1.1 Confirm that access rights for privileged user IDs are restricted to least
privileges necessary to perform job responsibilities.
7.1.2 Assignment of privileges is based on individual personnel’s job classification and
function
7.1.2 Confirm that privileges are assigned to individuals based on job
classification and function (also called “role-based access control” or RBAC).
7.1.3 Requirement for an authorization form signed by management that specifies
required privileges
7.1.3 Confirm that an authorization form is required for all access, that it
must specify required privileges, and that it must be signed by management.
7.1.4 Implementation of an automated access control system
7.1.4 Confirm that access controls are implemented via an automated access
control system.
7.2.1 Coverage of all system components
7.2.1 Confirm that access control systems are in place on all system components.
7.2.2 Assignment of privileges to individuals based on job classification and function
7.2.2 Confirm that access control systems are configured to enforce privileges
assigned to individuals based on job classification and function.
7.2.3 Default “deny-all” setting
7.2.3 Confirm that the access control systems has a default “deny-all” setting. Note:
Some access control systems are set by default to “allow-all,” thereby permitting
access unless/until a rule is written to specifically deny it.
10.1 Establish a process for linking all access to system components (especially access done with
administrative privileges such as root) to each individual user.
10.1 Verify through observation and interviewing the system administrator, that audit trails
are enabled and active for system components.
10.2 Implement automated audit trails for all system components to reconstruct the following events:
10.2.1 All individual accesses to cardholder data
10.2.1 Verify all individual access to cardholder data is logged.
10.2.2 All actions taken by any individual with root or administrative privileges
10.2.2 Verify actions taken by any individual with root or administrative privileges is
logged.
10.2.3 Access to all audit trails
10.2.3 Verify access to all audit trails is logged.
10.2.4 Invalid logical access attempts
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10.2.4 Verify invalid logical access attempts are logged.
10.2 5 Use of identification and authentication mechanisms
10.2.5 Verify use of identification and authentication mechanisms is logged.
10.2.6 Initialization of the audit logs
10.2.6 Verify initialization of audit logs is logged.
10.2.7 Creation and deletion of system-level objects
10.2.7 Verify creation and deletion of system level objects are logged.
10.3 Record at least the following audit trail entries for all system components for each event:
10.3.1 User identification
10.3.1 Verify user identification is included in log entries.
10.3.2 Type of event
10.3.2 Verify type of event is included in log entries.
10.3.3 Date and time
10.3.3 Verify date and time stamp is included in log entries.
10.3.4 Success or failure indication
10.3.4 Verify success or failure indication is included in log entries.
10.3.5 Origination of event
10.3.5 Verify origination of event is included in log entries.
10.3.6 Identity or name of affected data, system component, or resource
10.3.6 Verify identity or name of affected data, system component, or resources is
included in log entries.
10.4 Synchronize all critical system clocks and times.
10.4 Obtain and review the process for acquiring and distributing the correct time within the
organization, as well as the time-related system-parameter settings for a sample of system
components.
10.4.a Verify that a known, stable version of NTP (Network Time Protocol) or similar
technology, kept current per PCI DSS Requirements 6.1 and 6.2, is used for time
synchronization.
10.4.b Verify that internal servers are not all receiving time signals from external
sources. [Two or three central time servers within the organization receive external
time signals [directly from a special radio, GPS satellites, or other external sources
based on International Atomic Time and UTC (formerly GMT)], peer with each other
to keep accurate time, and share the time with other internal servers.]
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10.4.c Verify that specific external hosts are designated from which the timeservers
will accept NTP time updates (to prevent a malicious individual from changing the
clock). Optionally, those updates can be encrypted with a symmetric key, and access
control lists can be created that specify the IP addresses of client machines that will be
provided with the NTP service (to prevent unauthorized use of internal time servers).
See www.ntp.org for more information
10.5 Secure audit trails so they cannot be altered.
10.5.1 Limit viewing of audit trails to those with a job-related need.
10.5.1 Verify that only individuals who have a job related need can view audit trail
files.
10.5.2 Protect audit trail files from unauthorized modifications.
10.5.2 Verify that current audit trail files are protected from unauthorized
modifications via access control mechanisms, physical segregation, and/or network
segregation.
10.5.3 Promptly back up audit trail files to a centralized log server or media that is difficult to
alter.
10.5.3 Verify that current audit trail files are promptly backed up to a centralized log
server or media that is difficult to alter.
10.5.4 Write logs for external-facing technologies onto a log server on the internal LAN.
10.5.4 Verify that logs for external-facing technologies (for example, wireless,
firewalls, DNS, mail) are offloaded or copied onto a secure centralized internal log
server or media.
10.5.5 Use file-integrity monitoring or change-detection software on logs to ensure that
existing log data cannot be changed without generating alerts (although new data being added
should not cause an alert).
10.5.5 Verify the use of file-integrity monitoring or change-detection software for logs
by examining system settings and monitored files and results from monitoring
activities.
10.6 Review logs for all system components at least daily. Log reviews must include those servers that
perform security functions like intrusion-detection system (IDS) and authentication, authorization, and
accounting protocol (AAA) servers (for example, RADIUS). Note: Log harvesting, parsing, and alerting
tools may be used to meet compliance with Requirement 10.6
10.6.a Obtain and examine security policies and procedures to verify that they include
procedures to review security logs at least daily and that follow-up to exceptions is required.
10.6.b Through observation and interviews, verify that regular log reviews are performed for
all system components.
10.7 Retain audit trail history for at least one year, with a minimum of three months immediately
available for analysis (for example, online, archived, or restorable from back-up).
10.7.a Obtain and examine security policies and procedures and verify that they include audit
log retention policies and require audit log retention for at least one year.
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10.7.b Verify that audit logs are available for at least one year and processes are in place to
restore at least the last three months’ logs for immediate analysis.
11.1 Test for the presence of wireless access points by using a wireless analyzer at least quarterly or
deploying a wireless IDS/IPS to identify all wireless devices in use.
11.1.a Verify that a wireless analyzer is used at least quarterly, or that a wireless IDS/IPS is
implemented and configured to identify all wireless devices.
11.1.b If a wireless IDS/IPS is implemented, verify the configuration will generate alerts to
personnel.
11.1 c Verify the organization’s Incident Response Plan (Requirement 12.9) includes a
response in the event unauthorized wireless devices are detected.
11.2 Run internal and external network vulnerability scans at least quarterly and after any significant
change in the network (such as new system component installations, changes in network topology,
firewall rule modifications, product upgrades). Note: Quarterly external vulnerability scans must be
performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) qualified by Payment Card Industry Security
Standards Council (PCI SSC). Scans conducted after network changes may be performed by the
company’s internal staff.
11.2.a Inspect output from the most recent four quarters of internal network, host, and
application vulnerability scans to verify that periodic security testing of the devices within the
cardholder data environment occurs. Verify that the scan process includes rescans until passing
results are obtained. Note: External scans conducted after network changes, and internal scans,
may be performed by the company’s qualified internal personnel or third parties.
11.2.b Verify that external scanning is occurring on a quarterly basis in accordance with the PCI
Security Scanning Procedures, by inspecting output from the four most recent quarters of
external vulnerability scans to verify that:




Four quarterly scans occurred in the most recent 12-month period;
The results of each scan satisfy the PCI Security Scanning Procedures (for example,
no urgent, critical, or high vulnerabilities);
The scans were completed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) qualified by PCI
SSC. Note: It is not required that four passing quarterly scans must be completed for
initial PCI DSS compliance if the assessor verifies 1) the most recent scan result was a
passing scan, 2) the entity has documented policies and procedures requiring
quarterly scanning, and 3) vulnerabilities noted in the scan results have been
corrected as shown in a re-scan. For subsequent years after the initial PCI DSS
review, four passing quarterly scans must have occurred.

11.2.c Verify that internal and/or external scanning is performed after any significant change
in the network, by inspecting scan results for the last year. Verify that the scan process
includes rescans until passing results are obtained.
11.3 Perform external and internal penetration testing at least once a year and after any significant
infrastructure or application upgrade or modification (such as an operating system upgrade, a
subnetwork added to the environment, or a web server added to the environment).
11.3.a Obtain and examine the results from the most recent penetration test to verify that
penetration testing is performed at least annually and after any significant changes to the
environment. Verify that noted vulnerabilities were corrected and testing repeated.
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11.3.b Verify that the test was performed by a qualified internal resource or qualified external
third party, and if applicable, organizational independence of the tester exists (not required to
be a QSA or ASV).
11.3.1 Network-layer penetration tests
11.3.1 Verify that the penetration test includes network layer penetration tests. These tests
should include components that support network functions as well as operating systems.
11.3.2 Application-layer penetration tests
11.3.2 Verify that the penetration test includes application-layer penetration tests. For web
applications, the tests should include, at a minimum, the vulnerabilities listed in Requirement
6.5.
11.4 Use intrusion-detection systems, and/or intrusion-prevention systems to monitor all traffic in the
cardholder data environment and alert personnel to suspected compromises. Keep all intrusiondetection and prevention engines up-to-date.
11.4.a Verify the use of intrusion-detection systems and/or intrusion-prevention systems and
that all traffic in the cardholder data environment is monitored.
11.4.b Confirm IDS and/or IPS are configured to alert personnel of suspected compromises.
11.4.c Examine IDS/IPS configurations and confirm IDS/IPS devices are configured,
maintained, and updated per vendor instructions to ensure optimal protection.
11.5 Deploy file-integrity monitoring software to alert personnel to unauthorized modification of critical
system files, configuration files, or content files; and configure the software to perform critical file
comparisons at least weekly. Note: For file-integrity monitoring purposes, critical files are usually those
that do not regularly change, but the modification of which could indicate a system compromise or risk
of compromise. File-integrity monitoring products usually come pre-configured with critical files for the
related operating system. Other critical files, such as those for custom applications, must be evaluated
and defined by the entity (that is, the merchant or service provider).
11.5 Verify the use of file-integrity monitoring products within the cardholder data
environment by observing system settings and monitored files, as well as review in results
from monitoring activities. Examples of files that should be monitored:

System executables

Application executables

Configuration and parameter files

Centrally stored, historical or archived, log and audit files

72 

Yudit María
MS NSSA Final Project

Appendix B
Application
Name

Application
Type

Criticality

Comments

Card
Related

APP01

CMR

Extremely
critical

X

APP02

GPN

Complete, integrated solution for
CRM (Managing Customer
Relations), optimization and
business intelligence. It is a
powerful Internet-based solution
for companies that aim to
increase sales, improve customer
relationships, generate higher
incomes and greater retention.
Using personalized portals and
roles-based, provides easy
scalability and high performance.
Solution Business Process
Management (NSG) which
includes the management,
monitoring, control and analysis
procedures. We currently have
automated processes and
approvals for credit applications,
application flow and
administrative payments

APP03

IVR, CTI and
Smart Dialer

APP05
APP06

APP07
APP08

Extremely
critical
Extremely
critical
Extremely
critical

X

X
Contact Center Management
Financial System that manages,
processes, authorizing
transactions with Prepaid Cards

X
X

Solution packages that cover all
business areas of financial sector
in a comprehensive way

Mail, Calendar

X
Extremely
critical

Wrapped
management
system and
validation of
information
security Credit
Card

X

Management System for Loyalty
Programs

X

APP09
APP10
APP11
APP12

X
Corporate solution for electronic
document management, such as
document management,
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APP13
APP14

Web publishing

APP15

Web publishing

Extremely
critical

workflow, images and any type of
electronic document in a single
web-based application.
Integrated Application System for
the Administration Online
Accounting
A system that allows customers
to connect to the Bank for
financial services without the
need to visit any of our branches

X

Internet banking manager

APP16

X

APP17

X

APP18
APP19
APP20
APP21
APP22

Extremely
critical
APP23

APP24
APP25

Web publishing
Extremely
critical

Management system that allows
electronic transfer of Interbank
Corporate finance, banking,
managed funds and risk
management
Management system and
sending customizable by an end
user or departmental
System for Human Resource
Management, Payroll and Staff
Training
Is a fully comprehensive EFT
switching system for banks and
retailers to manage their selfservice systems with a united
delivery channel. Its layered and
extensible architecture enables
the future development of the
bank's business. By setting up a
united system interface for
various service delivery
channels, can be integrated
seamlessly with various systems
such as core banking systems,
card management systems and
third-party switching systems.
Manage automatically monitoring
the compliance requirements
related to the requirements of the
departments of the Bank,
established by laws, regulations,
administrative provisions, state
regulatory agencies
Internal communication to keep
employees informed about news
of interest
Financial System that manages,
processes, transactions
Authorizes Credit Card Collection
and Management

X

X

X
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APP26
APP27

APP28

APP29

APP30
APP31
APP32
APP33
APP34
APP35

Backup

System for managing the
operations of the Stock
Exchange
Recording System Customer
Surveys to measure satisfaction
with products and services we
have in the bank
Based system that serves as
Business Development program
that allows to monitor and assess
the growth and performance of
business executives, as well as
showcase the achievements of
the goals set for each
A system that aims to present the
results of the efforts made by
business executives, in addition
to displaying performance
statistics, trends, and it supports
decision-making in the
organization
System monitoring and
preventing fraud through
electronic transactions
System used for the operation of
ATMs
A system that lets you create,
publish and collect the results of
an online survey
Delivery system of accounts and
credit cards by email
E-mail marketing software for
managing your mailing list
* Processes Card Information but
does not stores it. Just processes
the Backup data.

X
X

X

X
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